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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Political objectives will always be involved where a body or organisation is 
intergovernmental and where, rather than being composed of independent experts, 
government delegates represent their states. The government delegates at the UN 
Human Rights Council (‘Council’) are responsible and accountable to their national 
governments rather than to the UN.1 Oberleitner remarks that it is unsurprising and 
somewhat inevitable that an intergovernmental body comprised of state 
representatives acts along political lines.2 Politicisation of international organisations 
has been defined as introducing unrelated controversial issues into the body.3 The 
difference between politics and politicisation hinges on the extent to which national 
objectives are related to the subject matter at hand. Of course, states will always 
seek to advance national objectives, but pernicious politicisation occurs when states 
introduce unrelated objectives that undermine the body’s mandate. Extreme 
politicisation may result in bodies losing credibility, becoming ineffective, or even 
delegitimising their own processes.4  
 
The Council has been politicised from its outset. Politicisation has been apparent 
through states advancing unrelated political objectives, groups shielding their allies 
from Council scrutiny, and politically-motivated attacks on some states that have 
obstructed similar action being taken on other, needed, situations.5 The Council’s 
structure and composition contributes to its politicisation. The frequent use of group 
tactics, such as repetitious statements, bloc voting, and vote-bartering,6 undermines 
the legitimacy of some, if not many, Council discussions and actions. Such 
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politicisation also threatens mechanisms related to the Council. Recently there have 
been signs of the Council being used to politicise and undermine the Special 
Procedures system.7 Assessment of the Council’s first decade must entail scrutiny of 
the extent to which politicisation undermines the body fulfilling its mandate. 
Criticising the Council in this regard does not negate the body’s positive 
achievements, but it is important to identify the politicisation issues in order to 
suggest methods for improvement. Whilst there have been a number of institutional 
reforms which attempt to reduce politicisation, there are prevailing fault lines that 
are a result of systemic weaknesses and cannot be ignored.  
 
Throughout the Council’s early years it seemed as though the new body would be 
little more than old wine in new bottles.8 The selectivity, bias and politicisation 
manifested somewhat differently than at the Commission, but it was no less 
pervasive or pernicious. Many states, observers, scholars and civil society 
organisations sounded the death knells for a body that was only just created. The 
Council’s credibility was undermined by the excessive focus on Israel, by events like 
the Special Session on Sri Lanka in 2009,9 and by its failure even to mention human 
rights abuses linked to the Beijing Olympics or to the Russian incursions in Georgia 
and South Ossetia. The turning point came with the Arab Spring uprisings in 2010 
and the fracturing of the Organisation Of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the dominant 
political bloc at the Council.10 
 
The Council seemingly became less politicised with a second wave of 
membership after the Arab Spring began. Fragmented regional groups and political 
blocs, largely owing to disunity and disharmony amongst the OIC, led to greater 
cross-regional co-operation. Between the Council’s 19th and 21st Sessions Israel was 
raised less in discussions,11 and fewer tactics were used to divert attention away 
from other human rights abuses.12 Instead the Council devoted more time to 
discussing the Arab states,13 resulting in an increase in the number of resolutions on 
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those states.14 At the same time the US began to engage with the Council, and 
many of the more moderate states, particularly from Latin America and Africa, found 
their voices. During those years the Council was more able to focus on fulfilling its 
mandate through a range of activities. Regular sessions included panels and 
discussions on emerging human rights issues,15 and regional groups and political 
blocs became less polarised from one another and took joint, effective actions to 
protect and promote rights such as cross-regional initiatives to sponsor resolutions 
on new mechanisms and emerging human rights.  
 
These steps forward demonstrate that the Council’s potential may be harnessed. 
A membership composed of more moderate states was crucial to this improved 
atmosphere, as was a clearer understanding of the institution’s working methods 
that had been negotiated and produced during the Council’s early sessions. Despite 
those strides forward, politicisation persisted in relation to some key issues. 
Selectivity in the Council’s dealings with Syria,16 as compared with other similar 
situations in the Middle East, is one significant example of how the Council ignored 
its founding principles in terms of country situations. Others include the Council’s 
treatment of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights,17 and the 
treatment of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who raised concerns regarding 
the human rights records of dominant states.18 In particular, the attempt by the 
International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) to use an intervention to draw 
attention to reprisals against a human rights defender in China,19 as well as repeated 
attempts by UN Watch to draw attention to the gross politicisation of the Council 
against Israel, have effectively been silenced by states selectively using procedural 
points to interrupt and undermine their interventions.20 In the sections that follow 
we address some of the key sites for politicisation at the Council, exploring how 
politicisation has been manifested, its impact upon the body’s work and credibility, 
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and how such politicisation represents backwards steps at the UN’s principal human 
rights body. 
 
 
 
2. FORUM FOR DIALOGUE 
 
In the run up to its establishment, it was envisaged that the Council would be a new 
forum for ‘constructive international dialogue’ on human rights.21 It would be a 
transparent, deliberative body, which embraced the principles of universality and 
impartiality.22 It would be objective in its work, and would foster cooperation 
between states to protect and promote human rights.23 The Council signalled a 
move away from ‘naming and shaming’ techniques that had dominated the 
Commission towards ‘genuine dialogue’ and inter-state cooperation.24 This focus on 
dialogue and cooperation, as a response to the failures of the Commission, is a step 
forward in terms of engaging states and promoting rights within a constructive 
atmosphere. In practice, however, politicisation of some if not many discussions has 
resulted in dialogues being hijacked by the tactics of states seeking to derail the 
Council’s work.  
Discussions in the run up to the creation of the Council placed weight on the 
need for ‘peer review’,25 dialogue,26 and accountability. The Secretary-General urged 
that the new Council was ‘more accountable and more representative’.27 This echoed 
broader calls for reform across international organisations, where civil society actors 
were demanding increased participation and accountability.28 The Council’s mandate 
reflects this ethos of legitimacy through the inclusivity invoked by the increased 
geographical representation of states, the founding principles, and the participation 
of non-state actors explored in Section 4.   
The work of the Council is guided by its founding principles of ‘universality, 
impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and 
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cooperation’.29 The preparatory work to UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251, 
which created the Council, shows that negotiations centred on the role of dialogue in 
the new human rights body.30 The Council is mandated to ‘[s]erve as a forum for 
dialogue on thematic issues on all human rights’31 and throughout the mandate and 
the Institutional Building Package dialogue is at the core.32 The focus on 
transparency, participation and inclusiveness fosters a veil of legitimacy.33 Whilst this 
air of legitimacy is suggestive of a step forward, the reforms did not go far enough 
to combat politicisation.  
Firstly, the founding principles do little to curb the behaviour of states. Those 
principles were created as guidelines for the body’s work and as a method for 
combatting politicisation. They divide into two broad categories: principles that guide 
its work on human rights, and principles that guide its relationship to individual 
states. However, they are only guidelines. They are open-ended and somewhat 
ethereal, not precise requirements to which states must adhere. There is no 
definition of dialogue and cooperation within the Council mandate, and there is little 
consensus on the meaning of transparency and inclusiveness in international law.34 
States can simply ignore or manipulate these principles, rather than adhere to them. 
Without clear requirements, states can hide behind the idea of dialogue,35 effectively 
doing little else other than talking about human rights. Dialogue becomes a positive 
outcome of itself rather than leading to greater human rights protection. As Lebovic 
and Voeten argue, ‘states might acquire reputations as law-abiding global citizens by 
consistently participating in international institutions’.36 The principles are weak and 
subject to manipulation by states, which means they do little to enhance human 
rights.37   
Secondly, the reformed membership of the Council does not address the 
political alliances that had given rise to politicisation at the Commission. The Council 
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Forwards or Two Steps Sideways?’ (2006) 55(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 695 at 704. 
36 Lebovic and Voeten, ‘The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the 
UNCHR’ (2006) International Studies Quarterly  861 at 870. 
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is constituted of 47 member states, elected from regional groups.38  There are 13 
seats for states from the Group of African States, 13 seats for the Group of Asian 
States, 6 seats for the Group of Eastern European States, 8 for the Group of Latin 
American and Caribbean States, and 7 for the Group of Western European and other 
States.39 Resolution 60/251 focuses on UN regional groups in apportioning seats to 
members in an attempt to achieve ‘equitable geographical distribution’,40 but it 
serves to reinforce the strong political allegiances within groups. The election 
process for membership to the Council is just one example of the strength of these 
regional groups. Often regional groups present only one candidate for each available 
seat. Without genuine competition, the human rights records of candidate states are 
not sufficiently assessed, potentially opening membership to states with poor 
records. The seat distribution also ignores alliances between groups, as had 
occurred at the Commission, which often results in what Schrijver identifies as ‘the 
Rest against the West’.41  
 
Other powerful political coalitions also operate within the Council.42 Non-
geographically-based alliances occur among both developed and developing states.43 
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G-77, which were the traditional Global 
South political blocs during the Cold War,44 remain loosely allied at the Council but 
largely have given way to the OIC, the G20+, the BRICS  - composed of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa - and the Like-Minded Group of Developing 
Countries (LMG) in terms of where the political power is vested. As Freedman has 
noted, these blocs have members from different regional groups, and they almost 
always have strong representation at the Council.45 OIC dominance of proceedings, 
the European Union’s passivity,46 and the undermining actions of the LMG have 
negatively impacted upon the Council’s work.47 Of those, the OIC and the LMG have 
been the most active in terms of politicising the Council to achieve objectives largely 
or fully unrelated to human rights. The alliances generally have had a negative effect 
on the Council’s ability to take action.48 States holding membership of more than one 
group, especially those with large membership, have many allies to protect them 
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[2007] OJ C 115/01. See, Smith, ‘Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights 
Issues at the United Nations’ (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 113. 
47  Freedman, supra n 45 at Chapters 6 and 8. 
48 Cf. Hug & Lukacs, ‘Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council’ (2014) 9 The 
Review of International Organizations  83-106. 
from action. States use repeated statements, supporting statements, irrelevant 
statements, and statements of alliance and allegiance to reduce the utility of 
dialogues at the Council.49  
 
The Council’s politicisation is attributable both to its membership and its 
structure. Understanding the Council as a forum for dialogue allows for an air of 
legitimacy – it appears to foster inclusion, participation and transparency - and yet 
this structural form does little to prevent politicisation. In 2006, Abraham argued 
that overcoming politicisation at the Council would be difficult because it relates to 
the ‘culture and practices adopted by member states’.50 This means that it is not 
something that can be rectified by changes to ‘working methods’ alone. She 
suggested that the Council would need to adopt methods that did not reinforce the 
regional structure,51 and it seems clear 10 years later that the focus on regionalism 
in the Council’s constituent instrument continues the  politicisation prevalent in the 
former Commission through the dominance of regional groups and political blocs. 
 
 
 
3. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SITUATIONS 
 
A vital aspect of the Council’s work is scrutiny of country situations within which 
grave or ongoing violations occur. Such scrutiny seeks to uncover and share 
information about human rights abuses as well as to devise strategies and to place 
pressures on states to uphold their human rights obligations. Yet it is in this area 
that the most obvious and pernicious politicisation occurs at the Council. There are 
three politicised ways in which the Council deals with country situations. It 
excessively scrutinises some countries, altogether ignores other abusers, and shields 
yet others from action taken against abusive regimes.52  
 
An early warning of the Council’s politicisation (which continued some of the 
practices that had undermined the Commission) was seen when it created the 
permanent agenda that is followed at each regular session. In direct contradiction of 
the founding principles of non-selectivity and universality, one country-specific 
situation alone is singled out to be discussed at every regular Council session. 
                                                 
49 At an Interactive Dialogue with the Commission of Inquiry on Libya on 19 September 2011, states from the 
Arab Group repeatedly welcomed and congratulated the NTC in Libya. See, Human Rights Council News Archive, 
‘Human Rights Council holds interactive dialogue with Commission of Inquiry on Libya’, 19 September 2011.  An 
example of an irrelevant statement arose at the 4th Special Session on the Situation in Darfur on 12th December 
2006, when Palestine drew attention to the situation in Israel. See,  Freedman, supra n 45 at 223.  
50 Abraham, A New Chapter for Human Rights: A Handbook on Issues of Transition from the Commission on 
Human Rights to the Human Rights Council, International Service for Human Rights, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
2006 at 28. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Freedman, supra n 45 at section 6.3. 
Agenda Item 7 mandates that the human rights situation in ‘Palestine and other 
occupied Arab territories’ is discussed under its own agenda item rather than in the 
general item on country-situations.53 Politicisation in this regard repeated what had 
occurred at the Commission in relation to Israel, and demonstrated that not enough 
had been done to ensure that the Council was anything different from the 
Commission. Excessive scrutiny of one country-situation through a standing agenda 
item is clearly selective, particularly given the persistence of other long-standing and 
equally or more grave crisis regions or situations. That agenda item was proposed 
and supported by OIC members and their allies, and the bloc’s dominance enabled it 
to secure the item on the permanent agenda. Clearly, the inclusion of Item 7 related 
to OIC political objectives despite obviously violating the body’s founding 
principles.54  
 
Singling out particular countries for excessive and disproportionate focus has 
been a recurring theme throughout the Council’s existence. Israel is not the only 
example of this type of politicisation in relation to country-specific situations. 
Throughout the Council’s decade-long existence certain states find themselves firmly 
within the body’s spotlight. Severe human rights violations coupled with their ‘pariah’ 
status that means they lack sufficient allies at the Council to shield them from 
disproportionate scrutiny. While those countries do require attention, human rights 
are not zero-sum – the Council only has a limited and finite amount of time for 
discussing and taking action on a broad range of situations, and therefore excessive 
scrutiny of some states detracts from its ability to take needed action elsewhere. As 
such, its excessive focus on one country is a tactic used frequently to deflect 
attention away from other, equally grave, country-specific situations.  
 
Israel55 and Syria56 have at different times found themselves in the category of 
having excess scrutiny as compared with other similar or worse situations elsewhere  
such as Russia’s incursions into Georgia, South Ossetia, and the Crimea, Turkey’s 
occupation of Northern Cyprus, the uprisings in Egypt during the Arab Spring, and 
many other situations that have been all-but ignored by the Council. Those conflicts 
have killed, injured, displaced, and otherwise seriously harmed large numbers of 
civilians, and of course are deserving of attention within the Council, and more 
broadly within the UN. However, the disproportionate attention given to those two 
conflicts as compared with other, similar situations57 that have claimed many more 
victims, at least in part is owing to politicisation of the Council.  
                                                 
53 HRC Res. 5/1, Part V (B). 
54 See Freedman, supra n 45 at 81-83. 
55 See, for example, Freedman, supra n 10 at 209-251. 
56 See footnotes 116 and 117. 
57 As pointed out by then-Secretary General Kofi Annan: UN Press Release, ‘Secretary General in Message to 
Human Rights Council Cautions against Focusing on Middle East at expense of Darfur, Other Grave Crises’, 29 
November 2006, UN Doc. SG/SM/10769-HR/4907. See, also, Speech by Kofi Annan, 8 December 2006, in which 
 It is no coincidence that those two countries feature highly on the political 
agendas of many OIC member states. OIC members dominate at the Council. They 
are the drivers behind the excessive focus on Israel and on Syria. In relation to 
Syria, which is discussed in greater detail in Section 5, OIC objectives vary between 
different member states depending on religious, cultural, geographic, economic and 
military interest in addressing the conflict. In relation to Israel, their objectives 
include political, religious, cultural and regional ties with the Palestinians and with 
affected neighbouring states. Crucially, those countries also use Israel to divert 
attention away from systemic violations within influential OIC members such as 
Pakistan, Algeria and Egypt. Irrelevant statements, such as during General Debates, 
when OIC members draw attention to the situation in Palestine, are still used to 
divert attention away from human rights abusers. The problem with these sorts of 
repeat or irrelevant statements is that they waste time and they influence the 
perception of a situation. 
 
Another reason that some countries overtly politicise the conflicts in Israel and in 
Syria is because of connections with the US and Russia respectively. Israel is seen as 
the US foothold in the Middle East. That relationship encourages anti-US states, such 
as Cuba, China, Venezuela, and Russia, to use Israel as a way of attacking US 
hegemony and interference. More recently, Russia’s involvement in Syria has 
received particularly negative reactions from a broad spectrum of states that are not 
naturally allied with one another, many of which appear concerned about recent 
hegemonic-aspirations from that country. The Cold War might long be over, but the 
practices learnt during those times still persist.  
 
It was hoped – perhaps even expected – that the Council would avoid its 
predecessor’s lack of even-handedness in country-specific scrutiny. Indeed, 
supposed ‘safeguards’ – that is the founding principles – were built into Resolution 
60/251 to achieve that aim.58 Yet these principles are altogether ignored when it 
comes to some country situations. The disproportionate attention given to some 
states can be compared with the failures to address grave violations in countries that 
yield political power in terms of alliances with many Council members. Such 
countries include China, Russia and Egypt, all of which are known grave abusers and 
where crises and ongoing abuses have altogether been ignored by the Council. 
When looking at the Council’s composition, it is clear why China’s abuses in the lead-
up to the Beijing Olympic Games (2008),59 Russia’s violations during incursions into 
                                                                                                                                                        
he stated ‘we must realize the promise of the Human Rights Council which so far has clearly not justified the 
hopes that so many of us placed in it’. 
58 See material in footnotes 25-33 above. 
59 Freedman, supra n 5 at 88-89. 
Georgia and South Ossetia (2008),60 and the grave abuses during Egypt’s revolution 
have not been discussed at the body.61 Those countries have strong alliances across 
regional groups and political blocs that dominate the Council, which means they are 
shielded from scrutiny and action.62  
 
In between the pariah States and the most politically-powerful countries are the 
very many others that have allies but cannot be protected fully from some attention 
when such attention is merited. Those countries rely on a different form of 
politicisation when the Council shines a spotlight onto grave abuses within their 
territories. States like Sudan and Sri Lanka have received proportionate attention for 
violations that may amount to genocides within their countries, but their allies have 
politicised discussions by shielding them from significant criticism or action. Instead, 
those allies have deflected the focus onto human rights abuses committed by non-
state actors within those countries or have called upon the international community 
to support abuser-governments through capacity-building and technical assistance 
despite clear evidence that those governments have been behind the grave abuses 
being perpetrated.  
 
Sudan is a member both of the African Group and of the OIC, which are 
respectively the largest regional group and largest political bloc at the Council. 
Sudan therefore received significant support from allied states,63 but that support did 
not fully shield it from attention. The weight of evidence meant that violations could 
not be swept under the carpet and that Darfur could not be kept off the Council’s 
agenda. Instead, Sudan’s allies ensured that the Council apportioned blame on other 
actors for abuses in Darfur and called for capacity building and assistance to Sudan’s 
government.64 Sri Lanka, which is a member of the Asian Group and has significant 
allies within that region as well as in key political blocs, relied upon appealing to the 
LMG, OIC and NAM on issues of sovereignty as a method for convincing those States 
to block action by the Council. As will be explored in Section 5, not only was that 
tactic successful in shielding Sri Lanka from criticism but it also undermined the 
Council’s ability later to take similar, needed action on other countries.    
 
The main problem with states shifting the blame onto other actors is that it is 
used as a tactic to deflect attention away from state-sponsored abuses. Calls to 
support Sudan and the Sri Lankan government were a method for shielding those 
states. They did not acknowledge, let alone deal with, the government’s 
responsibility for those violations. Instead, they provided a smokescreen that 
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allowed Sudan to continue to collude in the atrocities within Darfur and that allowed 
Sri Lanka to escape accountability for its grave human rights abuses. Although 
claims of lack of capacity may be true in fragile states, they are increasingly being 
used by many states that have the resources but lack the political will to implement 
rights. Those calls for assistance are taken up by states’ political and regional allies. 
It stops the Council taking meaningful action on grave abuses within those states. 
Instead, pressure is placed on the UN and aid agencies to support governments that 
are actually perpetrating gross and systemic violations.   
 
 
4. PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
The webpages of the Council tell a story of the participation and inclusion of NGOs.65 
Practical Guides and Handbooks are available to help NGOs understand the work of 
the Council, its processes, and the ways in which they can participate.66 At the 
Council, NGOs can attend and observe proceedings, submit written statements and 
make oral interventions, as well as organise ‘parallel’ events alongside Council 
sessions.67 The Council made participation for NGOs even easier by introducing video 
messages for oral submissions, so NGOs can send in their comments without paying 
for a trip to Geneva.68 There has been an increase in the number of NGOs 
participating at the Council. At the first session in 2006, 154 NGOs participated,69 
and in 2014 at the 27th Council Session, representatives from approximately 279 
NGOs participated.70 But the story from the NGO community is not so rosy: NGOs 
are denied accreditation,71 ignored within Council sessions,72 and have their 
participation challenged by states.73 NGO participation is another area where in 
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theory there is progress, but in practice, the politicisation of NGO accreditation and 
proceedings has threatened their inclusion at the Council. 
 
The UN Charter facilitates consultation with NGOs.74 The Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) has outlined the terms for participation and divided NGOs into 
three types of consultative status: General, Special and Roster. General consultative 
status means ‘organizations that are concerned with most of the activities of the 
Council’ and Special consultative status means ‘organizations that have a special 
competence in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of 
activity covered by the Council’. 75 The Roster is a list of NGOs that are considered to 
be useful on occasions. Consultative status allows for written and oral submissions. 
This process of applying for consultative status was subsequently adopted by the 
Council.76  
 
The UN Committee on Non-governmental organisations (a subsidiary body of 
ECOSOC) comprises 19 member states that recommend NGOs for consultative 
status. Responding to criticisms of a western bias within the Committee, 
membership is based on equitable geographical distribution.77 There are 5 members 
from African States, 4 members from Asian States, 2 members from Eastern 
European States, 4 members from Latin American and Caribbean States, and 4 
members from Western European and other States. There are a number of factors 
that should guide the Committee in its work.78 For example, NGOs should have a 
representative structure, possess accountability mechanisms, and they should have 
an established headquarters.79 The Committee should also have regard to the 
encouragement of representation from developing states and those states that have 
transitional economies.80 The Committee has four options: to recommend the NGO 
for accreditation, defer an application by asking a question of the NGO that will stall 
their application, vote for a withdrawal of the application, or close an application 
where the NGO is unresponsive.  
 
Despite these principles that should guide the questions from the Committee, 
states are still able to ask inappropriate questions of NGOs, thus stalling their 
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application for accreditation.81 In some cases, NGOs are asked questions repeatedly. 
For example, at the Committee meeting in June 2016, the International Dalit 
Solidarity Network was considered for the 18th time. Its application had been stalled 
in the past by questions from India. In total, it has received 77 questions from India 
alone.82 NGOs with limited budgets are prevented from participating due to the 
indirect costs of reapplying. The short deadlines to apply for accreditation and the 
budgetary constraints faced by NGOs are just two of a host of procedural reasons 
why access or participation at the UN is curtailed for NGOs.83 
 
The mandate of the Council explicitly provides for the participation of NGOs. 
The Council mandate extols the virtues of NGOs in the protection of human rights as 
it ‘[acknowledges] that non-governmental organizations play an important role at the 
national, regional and international levels, in the promotion and protection of human 
rights’.84 The involvement of NGOs is further buttressed through the procedures and 
processes set out in the UNHRC Institution-Building Package. This states that 
participation should include ‘all relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental 
organizations and national human rights institutions’.85  
 
However, there are limitations placed on NGO participation at Council 
sessions. The length of submissions are dictated by the nature of the status granted 
to the NGO: General consultative status allows 2,000 word submissions and special 
consultative status allows 1,500 words to bodies like the Council.86 The Council has 
working modalities that outline how an NGO should participate, often restricting the 
types of comments that can be made depending on the type of session.87 Limited 
time is given for NGO oral submissions. Usually NGOs have two or three minutes 
depending on the type of proceeding and even this can be reduced if Member States 
overrun in their submissions. Moreover, there have been recent attempts to stop 
NGO participation in the Council sessions. There are accusations that some states 
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‘pressure and intimidate’ employees at the Council to allow certain NGOs to speak88 
and states use points of order to hinder or prevent NGO participation.89  
 
The mechanism of Universal Periodic Review (UPR) has facilitated new ways 
for NGOs to participate at the Council.90 UPR is the review of all states’ human rights 
record. Three formal reports are submitted for each state, one of which is a 
compilation of stakeholder submissions. This stakeholder submission allows for the 
information on human rights practices in states and comments from NGOs to form a 
part of the formal reporting process. The review process is in two parts: the first is a 
working group session that NGOs are allowed to observe but not participate, and the 
second is a plenary session where NGOs can make ‘general comments’.91 
 
However, within UPR the extent of NGO participation is limited.92 Although 
they are present at the first discursive stages and participate in the plenary 
session,93 there is no formal role for NGOs in the Working Group stage.94 The actual 
scope for NGO influence can be restricted by state behaviour, as the state that is 
under review is able to determine to which, if any, comments and questions from 
states and NGOs it will respond. This restricts the influence of states and NGOs alike. 
In the discussions on the creation of UPR, states in the African Group had tried to 
prevent NGO participation.95 This was not successful, but liberal states’ challenges to 
information provided by NGOs,96 requests for NGO comments to be removed from 
the official records,97 and interruptions during their statements,98  show that 
attempts are made to undermine NGO participation in the plenary sessions. 
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 As noted, the Council has explicitly ensured a participatory role for NGOs. The 
introduction of video messaging, the space for organising parallel sessions, and the 
explicit role of NGOs in submissions to UPR is progress towards a more inclusive 
dialogue on human rights.  Nevertheless, the politicisation at the UN Committee for 
NGOs and the Council means that the participation of NGOs and their accreditation is 
subject to the political interests of states.   
 
 
 
 
 
5. SPECIAL SESSIONS 
 
The Council has two new mechanisms that directly address criticisms of the 
Commission and that aim to assist the Council with fulfilling its mandate: UPR and 
Special Sessions. Both mechanisms enhance the Council’s ability universally to fulfil 
its mandate and to respond to serious situations in a timely manner. But both have 
been politicised in much the same way as the Council has been. While much has 
been written about UPR,99 there has been little scrutiny of Special Sessions. In this 
section, we shall look at Special Sessions to demonstrate how politicisation has 
manifested within that mechanism and the impact it has had on the Council’s work. 
 
Special Sessions are aimed at fulfilling the body’s protection mandate and 
enabling the Council to respond swiftly to grave and escalating situations that occur 
outside of the time period allocated for regular sessions. A main failing of the 
Commission was that its annual session allowed neither the time nor the dexterity to 
deal with crisis situations. Special Sessions provide the ability to discuss grave or 
crisis situations inter-sessionally and at short notice. They are separate sessions and, 
because of this, convening a Special Session enables a quick and focused response 
without using time and resources allocated for other human rights matters.  
 
The Council is given the ability ‘to hold special sessions when needed’,100 but is 
not mandated to convene them. Rather the mechanism is left open for the Council 
to interpret and utilise as it sees fit. Special Sessions can be held at the request of 
one member, but only if one third of Council members support holding the 
session.101 It was hoped that this requirement would discourage the use of Special 
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Sessions as a political tool, whilst still allowing them to be convened quickly and 
efficiently where required. Of course, and as we shall see, that was a rather naïve 
and idealistic expectation. 
 
It was envisaged, particularly by the Global North, that sessions would focus on 
thematic issues; and although that has occurred occasionally – for example 
regarding the global financial crisis,102 the world food crisis103 or transnational 
terrorism committed by ISIS104 – the mechanism’s potential in that regard has not 
been exploited. Failures to convene a Special Session on irregular migration when 
crises have occurred in relation to deaths of migrants seeking to reach Europe by 
sea, bondage of workers in Qatar during the building of infrastructure for the 2022 
FIFA World Cup, or other similar crisis situations that have occurred, demonstrate 
that the mechanism is not being used fully for the purposes that its creators 
intended. Instead, the vast overwhelming majority of the Council’s 26 Special 
Sessions have been convened about country-specific situations. While such sessions 
are also needed it is only half of the mechanism’s mandate and potential.  
 
OHCHR staff involved in creating the Council105 foresaw and forewarned Global 
North states that the mechanism would likely be used instead to target particular 
country-specific situations for politicised reasons and that it was likely that the same 
selectivity and bias that occurred at the Commission would plague the Special 
Session mechanism. During the Council’s early years it swiftly became apparent that 
the warnings ought to have been heeded. 5 of the Council’s first 12 Special Sessions 
focused on Israel and the Occupied Territories. While that is a grave situation, and 
while crises arose during that time, the disproportionate attention can be compared 
with the sole Special Session on Darfur where a genocide was being perpetrated,106 
the sole Special Session on the Congo where more than 6 million people had been 
killed at that time, and the failure to hold any Special Sessions on countries with 
ongoing grave situations of repression, such as North Korea and Zimbabwe, or of 
occupation, such as Morocco and Western Sahara or Turkey and Northern Cyprus. 
Schrijver insists that when the Palestinian plight is considered, Western observations 
that the Council excessively focuses on Israel is questionable.107 However, owing to 
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similar, if not worse, abuses ongoing elsewhere, Gaer argues that convening three 
Special Sessions on Israel in the Council’s first six months raised serious concerns 
about the new body and its members.108  
 
The mechanism has similarly been politicised in the ways that it has and has not 
been used to respond to the Arab Spring Uprisings. In 2011 and 2012 there were 4 
Special Sessions on Syria, a country expelled by the Arab League and that no longer 
is protected by most of its former political allies in the MENA region.109 The situation 
in Syria and how to address the grave crisis has divided opinion within the OIC, so 
that political bloc did not vote en masse to block scrutiny of its member state.110 
Selectivity, and disproportionate scrutiny of Syria,111 can be compared with the 
failure to convene a Special Session on Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen, or even a 
thematic session on the Arab Spring uprisings generally.   
 
Politicisation through bias, disproportionate attention and selectivity was always a 
risk, but the methods for convening a session increase the likelihood of it occurring. 
Requiring  the support of one third of Council members empowers dominant groups 
and alliances to use this mechanism to achieve political aims. The larger the group, 
the more easily the one-third threshold is achieved. Once again, this has manifested 
itself in the mechanism’s use for selective, biased and politicised purposes, such as 
the vastly disproportionate attention being devoted to Israel and Syria, whilst other 
similar or more egregious situations have been given little or no attention. It is only 
when a state lacks political allies that the spotlight of so many Special Sessions can 
be shone to illuminate the human rights abuses occurring whilst also deflecting 
attention away from other similar situations elsewhere. 
 
A different form of the politicisation of Special Sessions is the way in which 
countries are shielded from scrutiny at sessions that were convened to scrutinise 
human rights abuses in those very same states. That tactic has been deployed most 
notably in the sessions about Darfur and about Sri Lanka. In both of those sessions, 
allies of those countries used bloc and group politicisation tactics to ensure that the 
scrutiny and action intended for those states were diverted to other actors.  
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In terms of the Special Session on Darfur, states allied with Sudan ensured that 
attention was focused on non-state actors’ role in the conflict and that support, 
capacity-building and technical assistance was promised to Sudan’s government. 
While those states had failed to shield Sudan from the Council’s attention, both in 
regular and special sessions, they diverted the spotlight away from the government’s 
abuses and shifted the narrative to one of the government being unable to prevent 
violations.112 That narrative, of course, is at odds with the vast majority of 
information and evidence available at that time about the atrocities in Darfur,113 and 
demonstrates the gross politicisation that can and does take place within an 
intergovernmental forum owing to politics being able to supersede the body’s aims 
and mandate.  
 
The EU called for a Special Session on Sri Lanka in May 2009, a week after the 
defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by government forces and the 
resulting fears about massacres etc. The government of Sri Lanka issued a joint 
communiqué together with the UN Secretary-General in which Sri Lanka reiterated 
its commitment to protecting and promoting human rights and the UN Secretary-
General emphasised the importance of an accountability process. Not only did the 
Special Session fail to enforce accountability, the outcome was a ‘deeply flawed’114 
resolution115 that put forward the government’s version of events, praised state 
forces, and pointed the finger only at abuses committed by the LTTE. The resolution 
passed with 29 votes in favour, 12 against, and 6 abstentions. Most states 
supporting Sri Lanka were its allies from the Asian Group or the NAM, who sought to 
shield it from Council action. Human Rights Watch said that Brazil, Cuba, India, and 
Pakistan led efforts to block a stronger resolution focusing on government abuses. 
Even more problematically, the resolution sought to entrench the position held by 
many Global South states that the Council cannot interfere with the affairs within a 
state’s domestic jurisdiction even though human rights violations are not understood 
in international law to be part of inherently domestic matters and indeed it is 
anathema to international human rights law to claim that abuses are exclusively part 
of the internal affairs of a sovereign country.116  
 
The option to convene Special Sessions on human rights emergencies was an 
attempt to address the failure of the Commission to respond to such situations. 
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Special Sessions direct time and resources to addressing particular grave or crisis 
human rights situations. Such an opportunity is a step forward in the protection of 
human rights. Yet, the process of convening a Special Session and the sessions 
themselves have been politicised.    
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
A decade on, the UN Human Rights Council can be praised for its achievements in 
terms of protection and promotion of human rights, but that ought not overshadow 
the criticisms that must be made and addressed. Steps forward – such as the 
introduction of fundamental principles guiding the work of the Council, the greater 
role for NGOs, and the option of Special Sessions – have been accompanied by 
simultaneous steps backward. Problematically, those steps backwards, which we 
have detailed in this article, are ones that mirror the same problems as beset its 
predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, demonstrating that the failings at 
that body have continued at this new institution. Despite emphasis on institutional 
reform through tinkering with and adjusting specific aspects of the body, the Council 
has been undermined by states using its mechanisms, discussions and sessions to 
advance unrelated political objectives. Politicisation is widespread at the Council, 
infiltrating the work on country-specific situations, special sessions and undermining 
the role of NGOs. The advancement of national agendas unrelated to human rights, 
it seems, is a major factor that undermines intergovernmental human rights bodies 
at the UN, perhaps demonstrating a need to revisit the discussion on whether 
governmental representatives or independent experts are the most effective 
delegates to such an institution. Or perhaps it is simply time to accept that the UN’s 
main human rights body cannot be expected to be, let alone tasked with, 
independent, impartial and objective protection and promotion of human rights – a 
sorry state of affairs, but one that reflects the reality of the situation. 
 
 
